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Residual Doubt: It's a Life Saver
Christina S. Pignatelli*
L Introduction
One of the most fearful aspects of the death penalty is finality.
There is simply no possibility of correcting a mistake. The horror
of sending an innocent defendant to death is thus qualitatively
different from the horror of falsely imprisoning the defendant.
The belief that such an ultimate and final penalty is inappropriate
where there are doubts as to guilt, even if they do not nse to the
level necessary for acquittal, is a feeling that stems from common
sense and fundamental notions of justice.'
This statement of Justice Marshall's reflects the notion that when
residual doubt about the innocence of a capital murderer exists, the idea of
inflicting the most serious of penalties is morally and socially repugnant.
Residual doubt, in fact, may be the strongest possible mitigating factor that
a jury uses to determine the appropriate penalty for a capital defendant.2 In
Virginia, procedural deficiencies that exist in the death penalty scheme are
never going to move public, judicial or legislative opiiion. In contrast,
residual doubt about the possibility of innocence may help to change the
tide. Recent studies by the Death Penalty Information Center suggest a
growing number of cases in which inmates on death rows across the country
are innocent of the crimes for which they were convicted.' In fact, with the
pardoning of Earl Washington, the fallibility of Virginia's capital punish-
ment system has been exposed." Residual, or "lingering," doubt has been
* J.D. Candidate, May 2002, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A.,
Emory University. Thanks to my parents, Dyan and Jim, and to my sister, Melissa, for their
constant support.
1. Heiney v. Florida, 469 U.S. 920,921-22 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
2. See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial
Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1583 (1998) (examining
results of case study in which denial was part of defense).
3. Frank Green, Innocent Inmates on Rise, Study Says, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, July
14, 1997, at B1, available in 1997 WL 7623699.
4. Frank Green, DNA Clears Washington; First Pardon in VA. After Death Sentence;
Unrelated Convictions Keep Him In Prison, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 2000, at Al,
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defined as "(1) actual, reasonable doubt about guilt of any crime; (2) actual,
reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of a capital offense, as opposed
to other offenses; (3) a small degree of doubt about (1) or (2), sufficient to
cause the juror not to want to foreclose (by execution) the possibility that
new evidence might appear in the future."
This article examines the public, judicial and legislative response to the
role of residual doubt. Upon examining public perception of residual doubt,
it will become clear that the public agrees with Justice Marshall's statement
above. In particular, the public response to questions about innocence is to
restrict imposition of the death penalty until conflicts are resolved.6 With
respect to judicial response to residual doubt, the United States Supreme
Court has stated that jurors need not be instructed on residual' doubt, and
that individual states must determine whether it is an appropriate mitigating
circumstance to argue at sentencing.7 Virginia has declined to allow residual
doubt to function as a mitigating argument in the sentencing phase of a
trial! Finally, this article will examine the Virginia state legislature's treat-
ment of residual doubt post trial. In this section, the article looks at the
following three avenues of recourse that a capital defendant, sentenced to
death, has in Virginia's system: (1) the twenty-one day "new trial" rule;' (2)
collateral proceedings, such as a habeas petition based on a Brady v. Mary.
land" violation," or an actual innocence claim based on a Herrera v.
available in 2000 WL 5049127.
5. William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Wy Jurors Vote Life or Death:
Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 27 (1987-88)
efining lingering doubt).
6. See infra notes 17-31 and accompanying text (providing further discussion of public
response to residual doubt).
7. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173 (1988) (holding that defendant is not
entitled to jury instruction on residual doubt); see also infra notes 32-36 and accompanying
text (providing further discussion of judicial perception and Supreme Court jurisprudence
on appropriate use of residual doubt).
8. See Stockton v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 196, 206-07 (Va. 1991) (holding that
defendant not allowed to introduce evidence and argue residual doubt at new sentencing
hearing); see also infra notes 37-56 and accompany. text (providing further minati o1
the Virginia judiciary's treatment of residual = ter
9. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (providing further discussion of the 21
day "new trial rule).
10. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
11. See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text (discussing in further detail habeas
proceedings based on a Brady v. Maryland claim).
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Collins2 proceeding;" and (3) executive clemency proceedings, including
commutation and pardon.' These options will be discussed with reference
to two Virginia cases in which death sentences were recentl Y commuted to
life sentences" and one case in which a pardon was issued.'
II Public Response to Residual Doubt
If asked whether he believed that the procedural deficiencies in Vir-
ginia's capital sentencing structure warrant a moratorium on the death
penalty, the average citizen would probably say "no." Alternately, if you
asked him whether the execution of a potentially innocent person warranted
a moratorium, he may change his mind. A CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll
shows that sixty-six percent of Americans favor the death penalty for a
person convicted of murder, while twenty-six percent oppose it.17 How-
ever, according to a poll taken June 23-25, 2000, fifty-one percent of Ameri-
cans believe the death penalty is applied fairly, while forty-one percent
believe it is applied unfairly, and eight percent have no opinion." Further,
12. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
13. See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text (providing further discussion of habeas
proceedings grounded upon actual innocence claims).
14. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (providing further examination of
Virginia s executive clemency proceedings); VA. SUP. CT. R. 1.1 (mandating that all new
evidence be introduced within 21 days of judgment); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963) (holding that suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good
or bad faith of the prosecution); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,393 (1993) (holding that an
independent claim of actual innocence does not constitute grounds for federal habeas relie);
VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-229, 53.1-230, 53.1-231 (Michie 2000) (providing procedures for
granting executive clemency).
15. See infra notes 97-117 and accompanying text; Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266
S.E.2d 94 (Va. 1980); Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1990). Three other death
sentences were recently commuted, but will not be discussed in this article: Joseph Payne's
death sentence was commuted due to doubts about his guilt; William Aristede Saunders's was
commuted based upon insuffiient evidence of future dangerousness to warrant the death
penalty; and Calvin E. Swann was granted a commutation based upon mental illness which
made him unable to understand his crime or the impending punishment. SeeDeath Sentences
Commuted in Virginia, RICH. TIMES-DSPATCH, Nov. 15, 1998, at A17, available in 1998 WL
2051048.
16. See infra notes 79-95 and accompanying text; Washington v. Commonwealth, 323
S.E.2d 577 (Va. 1984). ,
17. Jeffrey M. Jones, Slim Majority ofAmericans Think Death PenaltyApplied Fairly in
this Country, June 30, 2000 (visited Mar. 21, 2001) < http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases
/pr00630.asp >.
18. Id. The results were based on telephone interviews with randomly selected national
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eighty percent of those polled believed that at least one innocent person has
been executed within the past five years.19 Of those eighty percent, forty-
one percent believed that one to five percent of those executed were inno-
cent.2" Finally, with respect to DNA tests, ninety-two percent of Americans
believe that prisoners who were convicted before DNA tests were con-
ducted should be allowed to have DNA tests now because the tests may
show their innocence. 1 These national polls suggest that while Americans
are generally in favor of the death penalty, they want it to be applied fairly
and are distressed by the possibility of an innocent person being executed.
Results in Virginia polls were similar. Polls taken a month after Gover-
nor James Gilmore pardoned Earl Washington of rape and capital murder'
suggest that fifty-eight percent of Virginians favor a moratorium on execu-
tions until controversies surrounding the death penalty are resolved.'
Respondents further favored DNA testing to establish guilt or innocence by
ninety-one percent to nine percent.2" It is apparent from these results that
the citizens of Virginia are concerned about the possibility of sending an
innocent person to death.
The formation of various groups to study capital punishment and
recommend solutions is further evidence of the distress that the American
samples of 1,021 adults, 18 years of age and older, conducted June 22-25, 2000, and 1,020
adults, 18 years of age and older, conducted June 23-25, 2000. Id. One can say with 95%
confidence that the maximum error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus
or minus three percentage points. Ud
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Mark Gillespie, Americans FavorDNA 'Second Chance" Testing for Convicts, June
1, 2000 (visited Mar. 21, 2001) < http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr000601b.asp >.
The results in Gillespie's article were based on telephone interviews with a randomly selected
national sample of 1,024 adults, 18 years of age and older, conducted March 17-19, 2000. Id.
One can say with 95% confidence that the maximumerror attributable to sampling and other
random effects is plus or minus three percentage points. Id.
22. Green, supra note 4, at Al (discussing pardon issued to Earl Washington in wake
of DNA tests).
23. Frank Green, Moratorium on Executions?; Polk 58 Percent Favor Stoppage Until
Resolution, RICH. TIMEs-DISPATCH, Nov. 6,2000, at Al (citing poll results from Richmond
Times-Dispatch/NBC12PoI),availablein 2000WL 5052195. The 7Tmes-Dispatcb/NBC12 poll
was conducted by the research department of Media General, Inc. Id. The poll was based on
telephone interviews from October 27 through November 2, 2000, with 735 Virginians
saying that they were registered to vote and were likely to cast ballots in the year's election.
Id. The survey had a margin of error of plus or minus 3.7 percentage points. Id. Telephone
numbers were purchased from Survey Sampling, Inc. of Fairfield, Connecticut. Id. Numbers
were selected by a random method to ensure reaching households with listed and unlisted




people feel regarding residual doubt issues. A group called Virginians for
Alternatives to the Death Penalty2 has sought to encourage Governor
Gilmore. to impose a moratorium on executions and to issue guidelines
which ensure that the death penalty is administered fairly, and the risk of
executing innocent people is eliminated.26 A national committee made up
of death penalty proponents and opponents has also been formed to stud
wrongfuldeath sentences across the country and to develop resolutions.
The "Death Penalty Initiative" was formed by The Constitution Project, a
nonprofit organization that works to resolve controversial legal, governance
and citizenship issues but does not take a position on the death penalty."
The former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida and "Death
Penalty Initiative" chairman, Gerald Kogan, summarized the group's focus:
"[What] we share is a common abhorrence that innocent people are at risk
of execution because of failures of the legal system."29 Senator Kenneth W.
Stolle, chairman of the Virginia State Crime Commission, a capital punish-
ment proponent, said there should be greater protections for the innocent
in order to maintain the public's confidence.mp
These.results of state and national polls undeniably show that Ameri-
cans are concerned about the execution of innocent people. This residual
doubt is manifested by the formation of groups to address the concern.
Judges and legislators are also becoming involved. The public's perception
of residual doubt is similar to that of Justice Blackmun: "[T]he execution
of a person who can show he is innocent comes perilously close to simple
murder."31
25. For more information, see the homepage of Virginians for Alternatives to theDeath
Penalty <http://www.vadp.org>.
26. Frank Green, Executions Moratorium Urged, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 2,2000,
at B4 (discussing current state of moratorium movement in Virginia), available in 2000 WL
5028970.
27. Frank Green, Bipartisan Group Targets Wrongful Death Sentences, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, May 12, 2000, at A3 (examining the development of the "Death Penalty Initia-
tive. to discuss wrongful death sentences), available in 2000 WL 5037729. For more informa-
tion, see < http://www.constitutionproject.org/dpi/index.html >.
28. Green, supra note 27, at A3.
29. Id.
30. Rex Springston, Evidence ProposalRelaxes Law; Crime Panel's Draft Softens 21-Day
Rule, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 16,2000, at Al (examining draft proposal amending the
21 day rule), available in 2000 WL 5053098. Senator Stolle asked, 'How do you tell people
a guy is innocent and has no forum to get out of jail? You can't sell that product." Id.
31. Nat Hentoff, Sentencing the Wrong Men, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1998, at A17
(ex ng two cases in which capital murderers were found innocent and paid $500,000 by
the state of Florida), available in 1998 WL 16552544.
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III Judicial Response to Residual Doubt
The courts have long been aware of the existence and power of residual
doubt and have sought to limit its use during the sentencing phase of trial.
The United States Supreme Court, in Franklin v. Lynaugb,32 held that a
defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on residual doubt.". In that
case, the defendant argued that he was constitutionally entitled to an instruc-
tion informing his sentencing jury that it could consider residual doubt as
a basis for mitigation.- The Court rejected this argument and stated that its
prior decisions did not suggest that capital defendants have a right to de-
mand jury consideration o "residual doubt" in the sentencing phase of a
capital trial.35 Beyond this, the Supreme Court seems to have left it to the
states to determine the role of residual doubt at sentencing. i
While some states have given residual doubt a prominent role in their
sentencing schemes, Virginia has declined to do so.' Virginia's sentencing
statute, Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.4, suggests that residual doubt could
be admissible as mitigating evidence.38 The pertinent section states: "Evi-
dence which may be admissible, subject to the rules of evidence governing
admissibility, may include the circumstances surrounding the offense, the
history and background of the defendant, and any other facts in mitigation
of the offense." 3' However, through precedent, the Virginia courts have
foreclosed use of this section to argue residual doubt as a fact in mitigation.
In Frye v. Commonwealth,' the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a
defendant cannot contest the correctness of a guilty verdict during the
sentencing phase." In that case, the defendant argued that the jury should
consider the possibility that additional evidence might later demonstrate his
innocence.42 The Supreme Court of Virginia, in affirming the trial court's
32. 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
33. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173 (1988).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. SeeJenniferR. Treadway, Note, Residual Doubt' in Capital Sentencing: NoDoubt
it is an AppropriateMitigating Factor, 43 CASE W. RES. L.REv. 215,222 (1992) (examining the
role of residual doubt as a mitigating factor at sentencing).
37. Id. at 222-23.
38. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2000) (mandating that mitigating
evidence may include circumstances surrounding offense, history and background of defen-
dant and any other facts in mitigation of the offense).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. 345 S.E.2d 267 (Va. 1986).




prohibition, said that "the trial court would have been remiss if it had
permitted defense counsel" to argue that the jury's verdict "was wrong, that
the Commonwealth had failed to prove its case against Frye."3 The court
further stated that "[t]he issue of guilt had been resolved in the first phase of
the trial and could not properly be raised again in the penalty phase.""
The Supreme Court of Virginia revisited the role of residual doubt at
sentencing in Stockton v. Commonwealth. is Stockton contended that the
trial court erred by refusing to allow argument suggesting that he did not
murder the victim.' He claimed that failure to allow the jury to consider
this evidence violated notions of fundamental fairness, and violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
because it was relevant mitigating evidence.47 The trial court excluded
evidence of residual doubt because his guilt had already been decided at the
guilt phase of the trial.4" The court held that the defendant was not allowed
to argue residual doubt at a new sentencing hearing.49
More recently, in Atkins v. Commonuealth,1° the defendant contended
that Virginia's bifurcated jury system is constitutionally defective because
he could not, at resentencing, argue residual doubt with regard to his guilt
in the commission of the crime."' The court again determined that argu-
ment about residual doubt is inappropriate.'2
Despite the state court's power to prohibit residual doubt as mitigation,
studies show that juries use their own sense of residual doubt in determining
appropriate sentences." Residual doubt acts as an operative mitigating
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Stockton v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 196 (Va. 1991).
46. Id. at 210.
47. Id. at 210-11; see U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV.
48. Stockton, 402 S.E.2d at 210-11. The court was hesitant to allow argument about
residual doubt at the sentencing phase of trial because guilt had already been determined
beyond a reasonable doubt" in the first phase of Stockton's trial. Id.
49. Id. at 206-07.
50. 534 S.E.2d 312 (Va. 2000).
51. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 315 (Va. 2000) (holding that defendant
cannot argue residual doubt at new sentencing proceeding).
52. Id.
53. Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Patternsfor te Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 1327, 1338-45 (identifying three common factors appearing in murder
convictions that resulted in death sentences in Georgia: (1) certainty that the defendant was
the deliberate killer; (2) status of the killer in relation to the victim; and (3) heinousness of the
killing). Professor Barnett found that by increasing or decreasing the first factor, the
2001]
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factor when juries decide not to impose a death sentence because they are
not absolutely certain of the defendant's guilt.' The extent to which jurors
consider residual doubt may depend on whether the state court permits
argument about residual doubt at sentencing. In Florida, where argument
about residual doubt is prohibited, studies show that residual doubt is cited
by jurors more often than any other factor in the life recommendation cases
examined."5 Thus, despite Virginia's prohibition on the use of residual doubt
as mitigating evidence, jurors may independently decide to use their own
residual doubt about the defendant's innocence in making their sentencing
recommendation. Further, comments by capital case jurors in Virginia
indicate that despite Virginia's prohibition on argument about residual
doubt at sentencing, their own residual doubt impacted their'decision to
recommend a life sentence. 6
IV. Legislative Response to Residual Doubt
Since 1976, in Virginia, four men have had their death sentences com-
muted to life in prison because of residual doubt.5 7 Through executive
clemency proceedings, three received commutations, 8 and one was par-
doned outright. s9 This section will examine the limited avenues of recourse
available to these men and then will explore the facts and circumstances
surrounding their commutations. Part A of this section will set out three
avenues available to death-sentenced capital murderers who want to bring
likelihood of a death sentence was raised or lowered. Id.
54. Treadway, supra note 36, at 231-32.
55. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 28 (examining operative factors in jury's
determination of sentence); seeahso King v. State, 514 So.2d 354,358 (Fla. 1987) (holding that
residual, or lingering doubt is not an appropriate non-statutory mitigating circumstance).
56. Comments made by life-sentence jurors at the 7th Capital Defense Workshop,
Richmond, Virginia, Nov. 18-19,1999. See also comments made by jurors on Dateline NBC
that their residual doubts prevented them from imposing a sentence of death on George
Revelle. Dateline NBC, Searcbfora killer. murder before daun (NBC television broadcast,
Feb. 26,2001). For the full story, see < www.msnbc.com/news/535172.asp#BODY >. For
results of George Revelle's appeal, see State v. Revelle, 957 S.W.2d 428, 434 (Mo. Ct. App
1997) (finding that letter offered at trial was hearsay and remanding for new trial). Revelle
was acqued in his second trial in December 1998.
57. Green, supra note 26, at B4 (citing Henry Heller, executive director of the Virgin-
ians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty).
58. Death Sentences Commuted in Virginia, supra note 15, at A17 (reporting commuta-
tions).
59. Green, supm note 4, at Al (discussing the pardon issued to Earl Washington in the
wake of DNA tests.
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subsequent actual innocence claims. Part B will look at three defendants
who pursued theie avenues and ultimately had their sentences commuted.
A. Three Optins
The first avenue of recourse for convicted defendants to claim actual
innocence lies in Virginia's twenty-one day "new trial" rule: "All final
judgments, orders, and decrees, irrespective of terms of court, shall remain
under the control of the trial court and subject to be modified, vacated, or
suspended for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no longer."6'
This stringent rule mandates that twenty-one days after judgment is final,
Virginia courts are prohibited from considering new evidence. 1 If new
evidence suggesting actual innocence is developed after twenty-one days, the
defendant cannot obtain a new trial.'
The Supreme Court of Virginia has recently proposed elimination of
the twenty-one day rule for defendants convicted of capital murder. 3 The
Virginia State Crime Commission created a draft proposal, sponsored by
Senator Stolle, which was amended and passed in the Senate of the Virginia
General Assembly." The bill, effective November 15, 2002, allows the
Supreme Court of Virginia to issue a writ of actual innocence and return the
case to a lower court for a new trial, or do nothing if the new evidence is
unconvincing.
6
The second option for those convicted of capital murder in Virginia
with an actual innocence claim is through habeas proceedings. In general,
a claim made in habeas proceedings that the defendant had newly discovered
evidence of actual innocence cannot be successful. Consideration of such a
claim, standing alone, is foreclosed by Herrera v. Collins." In that case, the
60. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1.1 (mandating that all new evidence be introduced within 21 days
of judgment).
61. See Frank Green, State Court's 21-Day Ride: To Amend or Not to Amend Nov. 13
isLastDay to Offer Comments, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 6,2000, at Al (examination of




64. SeeS.B. 1366 (Va. 2001). The bill was passed by the House of the General Assembly
with 99 yeas, zero nays; it was passed in the Senate with 40 yeas, zero nays.
65. Id. The 2002 version of the Virginia Code Annotated SS 19.2-327.2 -19.2-327.6 will
represent these changes.
66. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); see Kimberly A. Orem, Evolution of an
Eighth Amendment Dichotomy: Substantive and Procedural Protections within the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause in Capital Cases, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 345, 355-59 (2000) (discussing
2001]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not bar execution of
a defendant who has newly discovered evidence of actual innocence if he
was sentenced to death in a trial free of constitutional error.7 Herrera left
open the possibility of a case in which evidence of innocence is so over-
whelming that executing the defendant would be constitutionally intolera-
ble. Such a case, which would involve much more than residual doubt, has
not yet arisen.
A defendant who has residual doubt evidence can also seek habeas relief
through a claim based on Brady v. Maryland" if that evidence Was withheld
by the prosecution and discovered after verdict.' The difficulty for such a
defendant is that his residual doubt evidence is unlikely to meet the stan-
dard: a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.'0
It is also possible that a defendant might have strong evidence of actual
innocence and claim that his trial did contain constitutional error. For
example, in Schiup v. Delo,n the defendant had both strong evidence of
actual innocence and a claim that the evidence had been withheld by the
prosecution in violation of Brady.72 In such a case the actual innocence
evidence is tested by a lower standard: the evidence must establish sufficient
doubt about his guilt to justify the conclusion that his execution would be
a miscarriage of justice unless his conviction was the product of a constitu-
tionally fair trial.' Actual innocence of this strength is the "gateway"
through which an otherwise procedurally defaulted constitutional claim (the
Brady claim) can be litigated on the merits.
In summary, evidence of actual innocence, standing alone, does not
make a viable habeas claim. Residual doubt, when coupled with a Brady
violation, makes a viable but ineffective habeas claim. Strong evidence of
actual innocence, coupled with a constitutional defect, makes a viable habeas
the implications of Herrera v. Collins).
67. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 393.
68. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
69. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the suppression of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process when the evidence is
material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecu-
tion).
70. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 296 (1999) (providing that petitioner must
prove that there was a reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence would have been
different had the materials in question been disclosed).
71. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
72. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 313-16 (1995) (examining the distinction between




claim with a possibility of success. Thus, none of these avenues is truly a
basis for successful resolution of a claim based on residual doubt.
The final option available to convicted capital murderers is executive
clemency. 7' If they are unable to succeed on the two previously discussed
avenues, the twenty-one day "new trial" rule and the habeas corpus proceed-
ings, executive clemency is their only hope. The power to grant executive
clemency is. vested in the Governor of the State of Virginia."' He may
choose to commute a sentence or grant an outright pardon.' In the com-
mutation proceeding, the Governor may commute a death sentence to life
or a term of years." If the defendant is found to be innocent of the crime,
he may be pardoned and set free."...
B. Three Case Studies
1. Earl Washington
Earl Washington ("Washington") became the first man convicted of
capital tiurder since the death penalty was reinstated in Virginia to be
cleared by DNA tests and issued a pardon." Washington was convicted of
the capital "murder and rape of Rebecca Lynn Williams.0 After being
arrested for another offense, police questioned Washington about Williams's
murder and took a confession from him." At trial, Washington denied his
guilt, but admitted signing the written statement." The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the conviction and declined to disturb the rulings of the
trial court or to reverse the death sentence."3
In 1994, Washington sought DNA tests." Based upon the results of
those tests; the governor commuted Washington's sentence to life imprison-
74. See VA. CONST. art. V, 5 12 (vesting the power to remit fines and penalties, to grant
reprieves and pardons in the Governor of the State of Virginia).
75. Id.
76. See VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-229, 53.1-230, 53.1-231 (Michie 2000) (providing
procedures for granting executive clemency).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Green, supra note 4, at A1 (discussing the pardoning of Earl Washington).
80. Washington v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 577,581 (Va. 1984) (describing the facts
of the offense).
81. Id. at 582.
82. Id. at 583.
83. Id. at 589.
84. Green, supra note 4, at Al (discussing the pardoning of Earl Washington).
2001]
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ment.8s In June 2000, Washington's lawyers asked for additional DNA tests
and the governor consentecl.8 In October 2000, Washington was cleared by
DNA tests and pardoned.8' He remained in prison serving time on an
unrelated assault charge.8" Washington was released February 12, 2001, on
mandatory parole, despite the fact that his lawyers contended that had he
not been convicted of capital murder, he would have been released six years
before. Despite his release from prison, state prison officials barred him
from attending a press conference in Washington D.C. and a surprise party
with his family in Northern Virginia.9
Washington's case provides an interesting examination of the options
available to convicted capital murderers In his case, the DNA evidence was
certainly not discovered Within twenty-one days of sentencing, so Virginia's
"new trial" rule was not an option. 1 Because there was no Brady violation,
he could not obtain a habeas proceeding on that issue.' Finally, without an
independent constitutional defect in his trial, he could not bring an actual
innocence claim pursuant to Herrera' or Scblup." Within the judicial
system, Washington had no further options in which he could raise the
newly discovered DNA evidence. Executive demency was his-only hope.
Ultimately, executive clemency proceedings freed WashingtoxV. However,
not all death row inmates are so fortunate. A recent American Civil Liber-
ties Union study stated that "those with recently discovered evidence of
innocence that the governor does not find persuasive or 6hooses to ignore





89. Anonymous, Freedom Deaye JusticeDenied, TH VIRGINIA-PLOT, Feb. 12,2001,
at B 10 (discussing Washington's release from prison), available in 2001 WL 9710323.
90. Id.
91. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 1.1 (mandating that all new evidence be introduced within 21
days of judgment).
92. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87(1963) (holdn that suppression of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution).
93. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,393 (1993) (holding that an independent claim
of actual innocence is not grounds for federal habeas relie).
94. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 313-16 (1995) (examining the distinction between
Herrera caim and gateway claims).
95. Green, supra note 4, at Al.
96. Green, supra note 61, at Al (examining 21 day rule).
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Herbert Bassette ("Bassette"), sentence commutations leave them with no
further recourse isnless the governor elects to issue a pardon.'
2. Joseph Giarratano
Giarratano pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to the charge of
capital murder and rape of a fifteen-year-old girl and the subsequent murder
of the girl's mother. Giarratano said he was high on drugs and that he
awoke in the apartment to find the two dead." The Supreme Court of
Virginia upheld the conviction.' ® Giarratano exhausted his state habeas
remedies and was denied a writ of habeas corpus in the Fourth Circuit."'
Giarratano's lawyers contended that evidence acquired after trial raised
doubts about guilt: for example, bloody shoe prints found at the crime scene
did not match Giarratano's boots; the stabbing and strangling were per-
formed by a right handed person while Giarratano is left handed; hair found
on the victim did not match Giarratano's; and, the autopsy report was
changed, after Giarratano's confession. 2 Because Giarratano was barred
from raising this evidence in the Virginia judicial system by the twenty-one
day rule and in the federal system by the restrictive Herrera and Brady
habeas corpus rules, he sought executive clemency."0 On February 20,
1991, Governor L. Douglas Wilder ("Wilder") commuted the death sen-
tence, just three days before Giarratano was to be executed."°
Wilder gave no reason for his decision, but said that he had reviewed
the evidence in the case.'0 ' He further stated that Giarratano should be
eligible for parole in 2004 after serving twenty-five years.'0 Wilder did not
have the power to offer Giarratano a chance at a new trial." He left that
decision to Attorney General Mary Sue Terry, who maintained that there
97. Death Sentences Commuted in Virginia, supra note 15, at A17.
98. Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94,94 (Va. 1980) (describing the outcome
of trial).
99. Id. at 95.
100. Id. at 103.
101. Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d 483, 485 (4th Cir. 1989).
102. Colman McCarthy, More than a Reasonable Doubt, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1991, at
A27 (reporting Giarratano's request for commutation), available in 1991 WL 2155798.
103. Id.
104. John F. Harris, Widder Grants Reversal ofDeatb Sentence;Murderer Could get Parole
in 13 Year, WASH. PoST, Feb. 20, 1991, at Al (describing circumstances of commutation),






was no mechanism for a new trial even though Giarratano was willing to
waive protection from double jeopardy in order to receive one."1
3. Herbert Bassette
Herbert Bassette received similar treatment from Virginia's executive
branch. Bassette was convicted of capital murder committed during the
commission of a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon.' 09 Three
individuals who participated in the robbery testified that Bassette was the
triggerman."o Bassette denied committing the crime and posited an alibi
defense."' He was sentenced to death and his conviction was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Virginia." The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the habeas petition and held
that Bassette received a constitutionally fair trial.'
After his conviction, Bassette's lawyers contended that there was no
physical evidence or other testimony linking Bassette to the crime."4 They
/also'said that an accomplice's police statement implicated another man in
the murder."' On January 23, 1992, the day of his scheduled execution,
Wilder commuted Bassette's sentence to life imprisonment."'. Wilder said
that he had seen evidence "that was not available to the court and the jury"
which gave him doubts regarding Bassette's guilt." '
For Giarratano and Bassette, residual doubts about their innocence
caused Governor Wilder to commute their death sentences to life imprison-
ment. However, because there was no evidence of absolute innocence, they
were not issued pardons. They were further unable to get new trials because
of the operation of the twenty-one day rule.
Virginia state officials say that these commutations are proof that the
system works." Mark Miner, spokesperson for Governor Gilmore stated
that the "proper precautions and safeguards are in place in Virginia to
108. Id.
. 109. Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 935 (4th Cu. 1990).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 934.
113. Id. at 942.
114. Jennifer Spevacek, Wdder's Doubts get Man OffDeaibRow', WASH. TIMEs, Jan. 24,




118. Green, supra note 26, at B4 (discussing the movement towards moratorium).
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prevent those who are innocent from being executed.""1 9 However, proper
procedures are not in place to prevent those who are innocent from being
imprisoned for life. " It appears that the public is concerned that proper
procedures and safeguards are not in place in Virginia's death penalty
scheme.12 Henry Heller, executive director of the Virginians for Alterna-
tives to the Death Penalty said that:
[these men would have been executed if it weren't for the
diligent work of a few individuals who uncovered facts not
proided to the jury at trial. While Governors Wilder and
Allen should be commended for their actions, I must point out
that these four men remain imprisoned and unable to present
their cases for innocence in a court of law.1
22
Eric M. Freedman, one of Earl Washington's lawyers said, "What we have
here is the state of Virginia desperately doing everything possible to avoid
facing up to its original, almost fatal, error and releasing an innocent person
who should have been free to rejoin his family a long time ago."
12 3
V. Conclusion
Residual doubt about innocence remains a factor in public, judicial, and
legislative response to the application of the death penalty. Procedural
deficiencies existing in Virginia's death penalty scheme do not come close
to eliciting the response that residual doubt provokes. In seeking to under-
stand the role of residual doubt in the eyes of the public, the judiciary, and
the legislature, this article explored the way each group responds to allega-
tions of actual innocence.
119. Id.
120. If residual doubt is sufficient to commute, it should be sufficient for a new trial.
To hold otherwise is to require defendants, who have legitimate claims of actual innocence,
to serve non-paroleable life sentences. The more appropriate remedy would be a new trial
in which the result would be acquittal or a new conviction. Further, such a new trial would
not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution. This rule would parallel the rule
set out in Tibbs v. Florida. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982). The court in Tibbs held that
the double jeopardy clause did not bar the retrial of a defendant whose conviction was based
on a verdict that was against "the weight of the evidence" rather than on insufficient evidence.
In such a case, affording the defendant a second opportunity at trial did not violate double
jeopardy. A legitimate claim of actual innocence is akin to a verdict that is against the weight
of the evidence. It would make sense to allow a defendant with a legitimate claim of actual
innocence to receive a new trial.
121. Green, supra note 26, at B4.
122. Id.
123. Green, supra note 4, at Al (discussing the pardoning of Earl Washington).
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The public is particularly sensitive to residual doubt. Where it per-
ceives that the death penalty is being imposed unfairly, or that innocent
people are being executed, the public cries out for restrictions on the use of
the death penalty, and even complete abolition.U4 The judiciary responds
differently. The United States Supreme Court has given states the freedom
to prohibit argument about residual doubt during various stages at trial.
Virginia has elected to ban it completely.
12
The legislature has attempted to provide avenues, including the twenty-
one day "new trial" rule, collateral habeas proceedings, and executive clem-
ency to aid death row inmates with actual innocence claims based on evi-
dence acquired post trial. 126 However, these avenues are restrictive and do
not guarantee success.12 This was evidenced in the three case studies, and
the circumstances surrounding the eventual grants of executive clemency. 128
After this close examination, it is clear that residual doubt will continue to
play a role in public, judicial and legislative perception of the capital punish-
ment scheme.
124. See supra Part IL
125. See supra Part MII.
126. See supra Part IV.A.
127. See supra Part IV.A.
128. See supra Part 1V.B.
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